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IN THE LAST RESORT:
A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
A review symposium of PAUL WEILER'S IN THE LAST RESORT (Toronto:
Carswell/Methuen. Pp. XV. 246).

A POLITICAL SCIENTIST'S VIEW
By

PETER

H.

RUSSELL*

Since the publication in 1968 of his article "Two Models of Judicial
Decision-Making," 1 Paul Weiler has been emerging as one of the most
systematic critics of appellate court decision-making in Canada. In the Last
Resort2 culminates this process. The book builds on a series of articles
Weiler wrote between 1970 and 1973 examining the work of the Supreme
Court of Canada in major areas of public and private law.8 Now he has
derived from that material a full-blown statement of the legal philosophy
which in his view should serve as the standard for assessing the decisions of
the Supreme Court. So bold an intellectual enterprise must be expected to
provoke criticism and this reviewer will express his share below. But even
Weiler's sternest critic should recognize the importance of his undertaking
and the thoughtful scholarship and good writing which characterize his effort
to carry it to a successful completion.
In the Last Resort is not written exclusively for the scholarly community.
It is also addressed to a more popular audience. Weiler is concerned to tell
Canadians outside of the legal profession what is wrong with the performance
of their Supreme Court and what they can reasonably require of it in the
future. In endeavouring to write for this wider public he leaves out much of
the scholarly context which has given rise to his ideas. While this certainly
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makes his book far more readable, it means that he sometimes fails to relate
his views to those of other scholars who have been concerned with the
same issues.
The essential idea at the heart of Weiler's critique of the Supreme Court
is not new. Appeal courts, and above all the nation's highest court of appeal,
should be concerned with the broad principles underlying legal rules and not
pretend that they can settle legal disputes solely on the basis of the bare
words of the rules of law themselves. A growing number of Canadian legal
scholars have been arguing this general case for at least a quarter of a
century. Not the least of these scholars is the present Chief Justice of
Canada. 4 Besides providing a much wider Canadian audience with an intelligible account of the need for an improvement in the jurisprudence of our
highest court, Weiler's book makes two important contributions to the
scholarly and professional debate. First, his prescription for reform in judicial
decision-making moves beyond such rhetorical slogans as "judicial-policymaking", "judicial statescraft", "activism" and "adapting the law to the
changing needs of society" and is elaborated much more carefully than previous Canadian writing in this tradition. Secondly, he illustrates his prescription through case studies drawn not from a single field of law but from a
cross-section of the Supreme Court's work in torts, criminal law, administrative law, civil liberties and constitutional issues of federalism.
Weiler's prescription for judicial reasoning is designed as a response to
the inescapable dilemma which faces an appellate court in our system of
justice, especially the nation's final court of appeal. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court, as a court, was established not to legislate or administer but
to adjudicate disputes. As an appointed adjudicative body, it is expected
(especially in a democracy) to apply the law, not create it. But, on the other
hand, the disputes the Court adjudicates are disputes about the meaning or
applicability of particular rules of law. To clarify an ambiguity in the law,
or resolve a conflict between two rules of law, or apply a rule of law to an
unprecedented situation, or fill a gap in the law, the Court must go beyond,
or behind, or above, or below the plain words of the law itself. Thus
"inactivism" is not an option for the Supreme Court; whether judges like
to admit it or not the Court must be legislatively creative, and because the
Supreme Court functions at the apex of our judicial hierarchy, its legislative
creation becomes legal policy for Canada. Much of Weiler's criticism of the
Supreme Court is based on the Court's unwillingness to face this dilemma
deliberately.
How would Weiler have the Court respond? His central recommendation is a method of opinion-writing in which the rationale of the decision is
expressed in terms of underlying "legal principle." Supreme Court judges
should justify their decisions in terms of the legal principle underlying the
whole branch of law involved in the case. Legal principles, as justifying
arguments, should make reference to the amalgam of considerations which
4 See, for instance, B. Laskin, Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What's the
Matter? (1955), 11 U. of T. L. J. 114.
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a judge may discern as society's reasons for having certain rules or standards
in its legal system. By reasoning in terms of principle a judge will consider
the "policies" or "values" upon which the principle is based. For instance,
the principle of mens rea which underlies many of the excuses recognized
by our criminal law should point the judge to such considerations as the
desirability of enlarging individual freedom, protecting the innocent from
criminal punishment and economizing in the use of criminal sanctions. His
recipe for legal reasoning would combine in the common law system some
of the deductive quality of continental law (particular rules deduced from
general principles) with a Cardozo-like search for the social policies implicit
in these principles. On the surface at least it seems like a promising solution
to the dilemma of judicial law making. The judge who follows it will not
close his eyes to the descretionary power he exercises, nor will he decide
merely on the basis of personal whim or preference. His reasoning will not
pretend that the case may be decided by the iron-clad application of a particular rule of law. But in going beneath or beyond the rules of law the
judge will "discover" the "strands of public policy" running throughout a
particular area of law and thus preserve the measure of continuity and
objectivity required of an adjudicative body.
Weiler acknowledges that his "legal principles" will not yield irrefutable
answers. Nothing reveals the validity of this acknowledgement better than
his own application of his formula. Readers who accept his general approach
to legal reasoning may well differ with his treatment of a number of cases
because they are not convinced that he has identified the proper or only
underlying legal principle in these cases, or derived the appropriate social
policy from the legal principle. Weiler's recommended approach to judicial
reasoning does not yield a logical formula whereby it can be objectively
determined that a judicial decision is correct. In this sense like earlier efforts
in other common law jurisdictions by Julius Stone, Edward Levi, H.L.A.
Hart and 0.1. Jensen (recently reviewed by Joseph Horovitz in his Law
and Logic5 ) Weiler's formulation fails to produce a special legal logic. What
it does provide might best be described as a special rhetoric or mode of
argument - a method and style of opinion writing designed to persuade on
the basis of a candid review of the full range of legal and social issues involved in the case.
As a critical standard for evaluating the opinions written by Supreme
Court justices, this "special rhetoric" has much to be said for it. Supreme
Court decisions will provide a more intelligible and coherent guide
for lower courts, lawyers and citizens, if they are argued in terms of the
more general principles which can serve as the major premises for a particular set of legal rules. In a more sophisticated age the disclosure and
exposition of underlying principles is apt to be more persuasive of the reasonableness of the Court's decisions. This might at least balance the risk
that judicial candour about legal policy will expose the creative role of the
court to sharper political scrutiny.
5J. Horovitz, Law and Logic: A Critical Account of Legal Argument (New York:

Springer-Verlag, 1972).
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Weiler is particularly effective in applying his standard of legal reasoning to the Court's recent decisions on certain aspects of tort liability and
criminal law. In these areas of law, to which legislators and public opinion
are relatively inattentive, there is a strong case for the judiciary assuming a
special responsibility for the development of the law. Also in these areas
there are well established legal doctrines to be judicially discerned and
analyzed in the process of evolving our legal system.
A good example of his critique at work is his analysis of the Court's
decisions on occupier's liability. He contrasts Mr. Justice Spence's opinion
in Campbell v. the Royal Bank of Canada6 with Justice Ritchie's in Brandon
v. Farley. In the first decision Mr. Justice Spence followed Mr. Justice
Freedman of the Manitoba Court of Appeal and, in considering the extent
to which the doctrine of occupier liability should deviate from the basic
precepts of tort law, weighed the ease with which an occupier could be
expected to take reasonable precautions to mitigate a recurring risk to his
invitees. But in the later case, Justice Ritchie writing for the majority simply
distinguished the Campbell decision by employing a conceptual difference
between two kinds of invitees without relating that distinction to the underlying legal doctrines and the social concerns they entail.
Even in these areas of the Supreme Court's work Weiler acknowledges
that the arguments he prefers are based on more than "legal principle", and,
in part, express his own "order of priority among social values".8 For instance, he attaches a greater importance to freedom of speech and the press
than to protecting candidates for public office from unfounded attacks on
their character. Consequently he is critical of the Supreme Court's refusal
to extend the general principle in tort law of negligent fault to the law of
defamation and so narrow the conditions under which newspapers are liable
for defamation.
Weiler is correct, I think, in stressing the role which "social values"
must play when the Supreme Court comes to a crossroads in developing a
particular branch of the law. In this sense Herbert Wechsler's notion of
"neutral principles" of law may seem naive.9 One might also agree, on
balance, with Weiler's own ordering of social values. But Weiler is sometimes less than judicious in giving reasonable consideration to views different
from his own. His sarcastic paraphrase of Justice Cartwright's reasons for
maintaining a broad liability for journalists' attacks on the character of
politicians does not do justice to what might be said on that side of the issue.
By way of contrast, he is much more reasonable later on in the book when he
expounds the virtues of the majority's libertarian decision narrowing the definition of seditious libel in Boucher v. The King.'0 Here he probes the weaknesses
in Justice Cartwright's dissenting position much more carefully and fairly.
0 [1964] S.C.R. 85.
[1968] S.C.R. 150.
Last Resort at 80.
9
H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard, 1961).
10 [1955] S.C.R. 16.
7
8
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One of the most instructive features of Paul Weiler's study of the
Supreme Court is the emphasis he places on the Court's function in settling
legal disputes concerning what might be called "lawyer's law"" - especially
the law of torts and criminal law. He brilliantly illuminates the policy issues
embedded in these cases and cogently argues that the Canadian Supreme
Court should play a prominent and, in the future, a much more skillful role
in developing Canadian law in these fields. On the other hand he is more
skeptical of the legitimacy of the Court's assuming a large creative role in
the principle branches of public law. In administrative law he is a vigorous
apostle of judicial restraint - a position befitting one about to assume the
chairmanship of an administrative agency in the labour relations field. On
civil liberties, he is no ardent supporter of a Constitutional Bill of Rights.
He sees the advantage of a statutory Bill which directs our judges' attention
to a set of legal principles which should be given "great weight" in legal
reasoning. But he cautions that "for the moment at least, we might place
greater trust in the virtue of our legislatures than in the infallibility of our
courts." His skepticism is most radical in constitutional law where, ideally,
he would like to see the courts vacate this area of adjudication altogether.
All of this is a good medicine for those whose expectations about the
Supreme Court's future role in Canadian government are so thoroughly
coloured by the United States Supreme Court. These expectations have been
particularly pronounced outside of professional legal circles in the press and
among popular commentators. It is hoped that Weiler's book makes some
impact on this body of opinion. For, as with so many of our institutions,
our Supreme Court's destiny is to be molded in the Anglo-American tradition. In Canada there is neither a constitutional basis nor a public mandate
for a Supreme Court docket closely resembling that of the Supreme Court
of the United States. Our Supreme Court's function will continue to have
much in common with that of the English House of Lords.
But having said this much in favour of Weiler's general de-emphasis of
"public law" in the Supreme Court's law-making agenda, I must dissent from
the extreme position he takes on the Court's role in interpreting the B.N.A.
Act. Professor Lederman has already presented a strong rebuttal to Weiler's
view that our judiciary should not play an important role in the process of
adapting and fleshing out the federal provisions of our constitution.' 2 Like
Professor Lederman, I am not convinced by Weiler that the division of
power under the B.N.A. Act is inherently so "unprincipled" that constitutional disputes between the provinces and Ottawa should be determined
exclusively through the political process. The stability of legal principle required by Weiler in this field contrasts sharply with the fluidity of legal
doctrine and social policy which he seems willing to accept in other areas
of the law. Our constitutional law of federalism through case law evolving
over a century, seems to me to present the amalgam of principles, and underlying policy concerns which are for Weiler the proper ingredients of judicial
"Last Resort at 222.
12 See his comment on Paul Weler's The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian
Federalism, in J. Ziegel (ed.), Law and Social Change (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law
School, 1973) 73.
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policy-making. There is, for example, the principle that sections 91 and 92
of the B.N.A. Act must be read together so that broad powers assigned to
one level of government do not consume more specific powers assigned to
the other and the principle outlawing colourable attempts by one level of
government to invade the other's jurisdiction. Underlying these principles
is a concern to retain some balance in our federal system through which
Canada might avoid the extreme states' rights position which led to the
American Civil War (or the crippling of national economic power in Canada
during the Great Depression) and the extreme centralization of power which
has now all but destroyed federalism in the U.S.A.
There is a more serious flaw in Weiler's argument than a failure to
apply his own doctrine properly. He has failed to give sufficient recognition
to the requirements of constitutionalism in his theory of Canadian government. This becomes particularly apparent when he recommends that private
citizens and corporations be denied the right to challenge the constitutional
validity of laws enacted by a representative legislature. Constitutionalism, as
the British system reveals, need not entail the enforcement of a written
constitution by the courts. But where, as in our country, there is a written
constitution limiting governmental authority, the case for judicial review is
strong. It would be difficult to understand in what sense the B.N.A. Act
is a law defining the limits of Canadian legislatures if there were no remedies
available through the courts for Canadian citizens who had good reason to
believe that the legislature had exceeded its limits. Canadian constitutional
cases, such as Ottawa Valley Power Co. v. Hydro-Electric Power Comm.' s
and McKay et a[. v. The Queen1 4 demonstrate that a private litigant may
have what I would certainly regard as a "principled" interest in the judiciary's
enforcement of the division of powers. Besides the division of powers there
are other clauses in the B.N.A. Act concerning Parliamentary government,
the independence of the judiciary, the educational rights of religious minorities,
French and English language rights and free trade amongst the provinces
any of which, even with strict rules of standing, may provide proper occasion
for the judicial determination of a citizen's constitutional rights.
Weiler, I think, can contemplate the termination of judicial review
because of his highly centralist orientation. He proposes a revision of the
Canadian Constitution under which there would be no fields of jurisdiction
exclusively reserved for the provinces. The federal government would be
paramount in all areas and could unilaterally decide whether or not provincial laws were unduly impinging on national economic interests. Undoubtedly this would eliminate the need for the Supreme Court to act as an
umpire of our federal system, but what would remain of our federal system?
Under Weiler's system, a Canadian province, like an English county or
municipality, would be constitutionally free to concern itself with any matter
so long as the central government permits it to do so. The American Supreme
Court's willingness to let Congress decide the extent of national economic
power may be acceptable to the American people and consonant with the
18 [19371 O.R. 297 (Ont. C.A.).
14 [19651 S.C.R. 798.
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reduced constitutional status of the states in the American federal system.
But to advocate such a dismantling of the federal system in Canada shows
a peculiar insensitivity not only to Canadian history and the realities of contemporary Canadian politics, but also to the benefits this country has derived
from maintaining a much more delicately balanced federalism than have the
Americans, and the courts' contribution to the legitimatization of that balance.
This is not to deny that there is much to be said in support of Weiler's
critique of the Supreme Court of Canada as an umpire of our federal system.
Even the Court's most ardent supporters would surely not look upon resort
to the Court as the preferred method of settling controversies between the
two levels of government. Political bargaining, federal-provincial "diplomacy",
as Richard Simeon calls it's has been and should continue to be the normal
process for negotiating solutions to these disputes. Since the Court's founding a century ago, constitutional cases have reached it in a remarkably even
trickle of two or three cases a year. Weiler is right to argue that this trickle
should even become tinier if governments would refrain from referring to
the courts abstract constitutional questions which are not ripe for adjudication. Further, there are strong grounds for his doubting whether the Supreme
Court can continue to be respected as a reasonably impartial arbiter of
dominion-provincial disputes, given the federal government's monopoly in
appointing its judges and the fact that the federal government has not lost a
constitutional case decided by the Court since 1949.16
Some reform in the method of appointing judges which gives the provinces an opportunity to participate in the process (but, spare us the ridiculously complex machinery called for in the Victoria Charter!) might increase
the Court's legitimacy as a federal umpire, as would more restraint in
responding to reference questions. But the basic solution, I believe, lies in
the application of something like Weiler's own recipe for judicial reasoning
to constitutional law. It is a pity that Weiler himself did not do this more
systematically in analyzing the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. If he
had, I think he would have noted, for instance, the difference between the
opinion of Mr. Justice Martland and that of Mr. Justice Laskin (as he then
was) in A.-G. Man. v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Assoc.'17 Weiler states
that in this decision the Court did not indicate that "it was doing any more
than follow a long, unbroken line of decisions."' 8 This may be roughly true
of the opinion written by Mr. Justice Martland. It is certainly not true of Mr.
Justice Laskin's opinion which carefully reviews previous decisions on the
Trade and Commerce power with a view to working out a more balanced
definition of this exclusive source of federal power consistent with the historic
purposes of Confederation. Or, to take another example, he might have
remarked upon the difference between Mr. Justice Locke's reasoned case
for exclusive national control over the location of airports in Johannesson v.
15 R. Simeon, Federal-ProvincialDiplomacy (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1972).
16 No federal law has been found ultra vires the B.N.A. Act since 1949. Twenty
provincial acts were found ultra vires between 1949 and 1972.
'7 [1971] S.C.R. 689.
18 Last Resort at 160.
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West St. Paul9 and the Court's flat assertion of the national interest in offshore minerals in the Reference case20 on that subject.
Most of Weiler's book concentrates on legal reasoning by the Supreme
Court since 1949. He is able to demonstrate how far some of the Court's
decisions during this period fall short of his standard, although he does not
provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there has been a significant
decline in the quality of Supreme Court opinion-writing. (I suspect that the
Court has never been very close to his standard.) He has rather little to
state about institutional reform of the Court, but what he does recommend,
for the most part, makes very good sense. He supports a pattern of reform
similar to that originally advocated by the present Chief Justice in 195121
which would give the Court more control over its own docket and enable it
to devote adequate time to researching and deliberating on major difficulties
in the nation's system of laws. Reform of this kind, as Delmar Karlen pointed
out some years ago when comparing British and American appellate courts,
is appropriate for judges who "place greater stress on their lawmaking functions.., being at least as interested in laying down guidelines for the future
as in deciding correctly the cases before them. '22 Weiler's elucidation of the
standard of legal reasoning required of a nation's final court of appeal provides a clear rationale for reform which moves the Canadian Supreme Court
in this direction.
There are just two points in Weiler's agenda of institutional reform
which I would question. First, he is not pleased with the reduction since
1949 in the number of opinions written per case. While I would agree that
it is unfortunate if the increase in the Court's workload has meant the
elimination of significant dissenting or concurring opinions, still there may
be some gain if a confusing profusion of concurring opinions has given way
to a more coherent collegiality. Secondly, Weiler's indifference to the principles of federalism prevents him from giving sufficient attention to the
possible benefits to be realized from granting the provinces the right to
designate the final court of appeal in matters of provincial law where there
is strong reason to believe that a provincial court of appeal may be the most
competent judicial law-developer. Such a constitutional reform could be particularly important for Quebec if that province is to maintain its distinctive
2s
system of civil law.
[1952] 1 S.C.R. 292.
Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792.
21 B. Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of Appeal of and for
Canadians (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1038.
22
D. Karlen, Appellate Courts in the United States and England (New York:
N.Y.U.
Press, 1963) at 157-58.
2
3Two previous judicial decisions, A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can., [1947] A.C. 127
(P.C.) and Crown Grain Co. Ltd. v. Day, [1908] A.C. 504 (P.C.), indicate that the
B.N.A. Act would have to be amended if the principle I have previously advocated
in this journal is to be realized, namely: "Under a constitution which is to be both
federal and flexible the possibility of judicial self-government for the provinces in
matters constitutionally assigned to them should be neither mandatory nor impossible."
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada.: Present Policies and a Programme
for Reform (1968), 6 Osgoode Hall L. J.1 at 33.
10
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It is the mark of an important book, to ask important questions. Weiler
has surely done that. His book raises the most fundamental questions about
judicial review and judicial decision-making in Canada's highest court. His
formulation of an approach to judicial reasoning is an advance on the
efforts of previous Canadian writers of his persuasion, although I think he is
overly optimistic about the objectivity to be realized through this approach.
There is also, on occasion, a partisan quality to his handling of certain issues,
which is not well calculated to convince others of the reasonableness of his
own position. His extremely negative recommendation for judicial interpretation of the Constitution does not provide a very useful guide for the
future of constitutional jurisprudence in Canada. Still, by elucidating these
basic questions about the role of our Supreme Court so thoughtfully and so
clearly for both law professionals and interested Canadian citizens, his book
is a major accomplishment. It is a comment on the colonial and underdeveloped quality of our legal culture that it is only after a century of the
Supreme Court's existence that a major work on the Court's jurisprudence
has appeared.

